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ESSAY
THE NEED FOR MAREVA INJUNCTIONS
RECONSIDERED
David Capper*
INTRODUCTION
American courts have been deprived of a most useful tool created
by the common law courts in England-the Mareva injunction-
because of a 5-4 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.1 In
this case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,2 and erroneously condemned, in dicta,
all Mareva injunctions in a case where such relief would probably not
have been granted in England or the other common law jurisdictions
that use it. It is the essence of this essay that the usefulness of the
Mareva injunction must be reconsidered and approved. The beauty of
the Mareva injunction-before a decision on the merits-is that
claimants can protect their potential judgments at an early time in a
dispute when the location of assets against which judgment may be
enforced is not a game of hide and seek. Of course, the law of
fraudulent conveyances, by state statute or as included in the federal
Bankruptcy Act, permits the recapture of assets, the disposal of which
rendered a debtor insolvent. But this is often a fruitless and expensive
chore, seldom producing sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment;
hence the utility of the Mareva injunction to freeze assets before they
can be concealed. The reasoning of the majority of the Supreme
Court in Grupo Mexicano was thoroughly unconvincing and fully
deserving of the polite but trenchant criticism of a commentator in the
Law Quarterly Review.3
* Barrister of the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland; Reader in Law, Queen's
University Belfast. LL.B (QUB); LL.M (Cantab). The author gratefully
acknowledges the comments made on an earlier draft of this Essay by Professor
Joseph C. Sweeney. Responsibility for any errors remain entirely the author's own.
1. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
2. Id. at 333 (reversing Alliance Bond Fund v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A., 143 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998)).
3. Lawrence Collins, United States Supreme Court Rejects Mareva Jurisdiction,
115 Law Q. Rev. 601, 604 (1999) (stating that "from an English viewpoint, the
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I. THE MAREVA INJUNCTION: AN INTERVIEW
A Mareva injunction is an interlocutory (normally ex parte)
injunction restraining a defendant in civil litigation from disposing of
assets so as to render itself judgment proof. It operates in personam
against the defendant and does not confer upon the plaintiff any rights
in the assets or enhanced priority in the event of the defendant's
insolvency. The procedure takes its name from the decision of the
English Court of Appeal in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v.
International Bulkcarriers S.A.4 While the early Mareva decisions in
England certainly did break new ground, the change was not as
revolutionary as a majority of the Supreme Court "made out."5 The
only major common law jurisdiction where the Mareva injunction has
not flourished is the United States. To persuade a court to grant this
relief a litigant normally has to prove the following:
1. A cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court asked to
grant relief. This is necessary because the plaintiff's claim for
Mareva relief is to prevent the disposal of assets that would frustrate
the enforcement of judgment in that action. The need for a cause of
action within the jurisdiction was first established by the House of
Lords in Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A.6 and reaffirmed
by the Privy Council in Mercedes Benz A.G. v. Leiduck. Today in
the United Kingdom, this is more of an exception than a rule
because the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts of 1982 and 1991
allow British courts to grant Mareva relief in support of proceedings
going on in European Union and European Economic Area
countries. Indeed the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1982
(Interim Relief) Order 1997,8 made pursuant to section 25(3) of the
1982 Act, has now authorized the High Court to grant interim
protective measures in aid of overseas proceedings generally.9
discussion ... of the Mareva jurisdiction seems to be superficial and based on
obsolete material").
4. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A. 1975). The first case to recognize the legitimacy of
this procedure preceded Mareva by just a few weeks. See Nippon Yusen Kaisha v.
Karageorgis, 1 W.L.R. 1093 (C.A. 1975).
5. The story of the early life of the Mareva injunction and how its legitimacy was
established is told in David Capper, The Mareva Injunction-From Birth to Adulthood,
in The Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century 255 (E. O'Dell ed., 2000).
6. [1979] 2 A.C. 210 (H.L. 1977).
7. [1996] 1 A.C. 284 (P.C. 1995) (appeal taken from Hong Kong).
8. (1997) SI 1997/302.
9. For commentary on this development, see David Capper, Further Trans-
Jurisdictional Effects of Mareva Injunctions, 17 Civ. Just. Q. 35 (1998). Under the
statute relief may be declined if "in the opinion of the court, the fact that the court
has no jurisdiction apart from this section in relation to the subject matter of the
proceedings in question makes it inexpedient for the court to grant it." Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982 (Interim Relief) Order 1997, (1997) S.I.
1997/302. For a case where a Mareva injunction was granted in aid of proceedings in
the United States, see Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan (No. 6), [2004] 1 W.L.R. 113(C.A. 2003).
2162 [Vol. 73
MAREVA INJUNCTIONS
2. A "good arguable case" on the merits of that cause of action."l In
Grupo Mexicano it was stressed that the plaintiffs were almost
certain to win their case, but "good arguable case" means something
rather less than that. English courts have resisted the temptation to
explain the concept in percentage terms because most Mareva
applications are ex parte and prospects of success cannot be
quantified." In essence, "good arguable case" means that on the
material before the court the plaintiff appears to have real prospects
of success. Doubts about the plaintiff's chances of success at trial
can go against it either because the court thinks there is insufficient
support for a "good arguable case" or in the exercise of the court's
overall discretion.
3. A real risk that any judgment the plaintiff obtains in the
proceedings will go unsatisfied.12 Originally,. it was necessary to
show that assets were at risk of being transferred out of the
jurisdiction, 3 but by the 1980s courts were showing signs of
extending the injunction/procedure to disposals of assets within the
jurisdiction. Section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act of 198114
confirmed the matter as far as England was concerned and other
jurisdictions have followed suit. Courts in the Republic of Ireland
apparently insist on evidence that the defendant intends by its
disposal of assets to render itself judgment proof.15 If this is really
the position of Irish courts, it is different from other jurisdictions
which appear only to insist on a risk of disposal for no good reason,
such as meeting obligations to other creditors.
16
4. That it is just and convenient to grant relief. No authority need
be cited here because the proposition is an elementary one. An
injunction is an equitable remedy and subject to the discretion of the
court. Should it appear that there are significant doubts about the
plaintiff's claim for relief or that excessive hardship would be caused
to the defendant then relief can be refused. What normally happens
is that the injunction is granted on an ex parte application and any
reasons why relief should not be granted are considered if the
defendant applies to discharge or vary the injunction.
The above are the most significant matters that a plaintiff must
prove. Some other important features of Mareva injunctions should
10. See Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft GmbH (The
Niedersachsen), [1984] 1 All E.R. 398 (C.A. 1983); Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan, [19781 1 Q.B. 644 (C.A. 1977).
11. Grupo Mexicano was inter partes but there is no different rule in these
applications.
12. See Ninemia, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 398.
13. See Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, 3 All E.R. 190 (Ch. 1980).
14. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 37(3) (Eng.)
15. See O'Mahony v. Horgan, [1995] 2 I.R. 411 (Ir. S.C.); Countyglen plc v.
Carway, [1995] 1 I.R. 208 (Ir. H. Ct.).
16. See David Capper, Mareva Injunctions: A Distinctively Irish Doctrine?, 17
Dublin U. L.J. 110 (1995).
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also be stated at this stage. Although they are interlocutory orders,
Mareva injunctions can be granted after judgment17 and normally are
continued after judgment. They are usually granted against assets
within the jurisdiction of the court, but in a series of cases in the late
1980s the English Court of Appeal extended relief to extraterritorial
assets. 8 As equity acts in personam and not against the defendant's
assets, there was no reason why the court could not reach
extraterritorial assets. But a major practical consideration, of which
courts were already well aware, was highlighted by this development.
To make a Mareva injunction stick it is necessary to serve it on third
parties, particularly banks that are holding the defendant's assets, and
enjoin them from allowing the assets to be disposed of. 9 Certain
procedural safeguards have to be built into the injunction to protect
third parties from other liabilities to which they might otherwise be
subject. This was accomplished for orders concerning assets within
the jurisdiction in Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL 2 ° and for extraterritorial
orders by means of the Babanaft proviso which exempts third parties
from actions necessary to avoid legal liability under the law of another
jurisdiction.21
Mareva injunctions contain a number of procedural and other
safeguards for the protection of the defendant. If granted, the usual
order is limited to the maximum amount of the plaintiff's claim.22
Because most applications are made ex parte there is a duty on the
applicant to make full and frank disclosure of all matters of relevance
17. Stewart Chartering, Ltd. v. C. & 0. Mgmts. S.A., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 460 (Q.B.
1979).
18. See Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1990] 1 C.A. 202 (1988); Derby & Co. Ltd.
v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] 1 Ch. 65 (1989); Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne,
[1990] 1 Ch. 13 (1988); Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon, [1990] 1 Ch. 48 (1988); see also
David Capper, Worldwide Mareva Injunctions, 54 Mod. L. Rev. 329 (1991); Lawrence
Collins, The Territorial Reach of Mareva Injunctions, 105 Law Q. Rev. 262 (1989).
19. The English Court of Appeal has recently decided that a bank holding a
Mareva defendant's assets, on whom a Mareva injunction is served, owes the plaintiff
a duty of care in tort to ensure that the frozen assets are not disposed of. See Comm'rs
of Customs and Excise v. Barclays Bank -lc, [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 165 (C.A. 2004),
available at 2004 WL 25282645 (summary).
20. [1982] 1 Q.B. 558 (C.A. 1981).
21. See Babanaft, [1990] Ch. at 36. The terms of the proviso are:
Provided always that no person other than the defendants themselves shall
in any way be affected by the terms of this order ... or concerned to enquire
whether any instruction given by or on behalf of either defendant or anyone
else, or any other act or omission of either defendant or anyone else,
whether acting on behalf of either defendant or otherwise, is or may be a
breach of this order.., by either defendant ... (unless and to the extent that
it is enforced by the courts of the states in which any of the defendants'
assets are located).
Id.
22. Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 558.
2164 [Vol. 73
MAREVA INJUNCTIONS
of which the court should be aware. 23 As Sir Peter Pain pointed out in
O'Regan v. Iambic Productions Ltd., 4 this applies in particular to
matters not in the applicant's favor. Failure to discharge this duty
normally results in the injunction being discharged on the application
of the defendant. As with all interlocutory injunctions, the applicant
usually has to give an undertaking in damages to compensate the
defendant should it become clear later that the injunction should not
have been granted, for example, when the defendant successfully
applies to the court to discharge the injunction. The practice of some
courts, such as the Chancery Division in England, is to review Mareva
injunctions at an inter partes hearing a short time after the grant of an
ex parte order. As an alternative to discharge of the order, the
defendant may seek a variation that allows payments to be made to
third parties in the ordinary course of business or reasonable
expenditure to be incurred. The order normally specifies a sum for
reasonable living expenses but this may have to be adjusted in light of
information the defendant puts before the court.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Grupo Mexicano argued that there was
nothing new about debtors not paying debts or preferring creditors.
This is, with respect, a disturbingly complacent view of the reality of
modern civil litigation. As Lord Hoffmann pointed out in his
foreword to Steven Gee's Mareva Injunctions and Anton Pillar
Relief,26 it became apparent by the 1960s that "civil law remedies were
inadequate to deal with cases in which there was often no serious
dispute: the problem was simply the enforcement of the law against a
party who was determined to evade it."' 27 Everyone knows that there
are many more judgments marked in default of defense and
settlements out of court than there are trials. Whether evading legal
liabilities through disposal of assets is new or not, it is a real and
serious phenomenon. Failure to deal with it allows the legal process
to be treated with contempt. Probably, at least, the extent of the
problem is a feature of modern technology which enables assets to be
whisked away in an instant-a matter only grudgingly acknowledged
by Justice Scalia. 28 How the English courts came to change their
previous practice and grant these injunctions will be discussed in the
context of analyzing the opinion of the Court below.
23. R. v. Kensington Income Tax Comm'rs ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac,
[1917] 1 K.B. 486 (C.A. 1917); Dormeuil Freres S.A. v. Nicolian Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R.
1362 (Ch. 1988).
24. 139 New L.J. 1378 (Q.B. 1989).
25. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 322 (1998).
26. Steven Gee, Mareva Injunctions and Anton Pillar Relief (4th ed. 1998).
27. Id. at xiii.
28. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322.
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II. GRUPO MEXICANO-FACTS AND HISTORY
To supply the context in which the Supreme Court came to decide
the issue of whether federal courts could grant Mareva relief, it is
necessary to at least outline the facts and procedural history of the
Grupo Mexicano case. This history also explains one issue on which
the dissenters joined the opinion of the Court, an issue worth
discussing because it illuminates the nature of the Mareva injunction.
The plaintiffs (Alliance Bond) were investment funds that had
purchased $75 million (out of $250 million) of unsecured notes issued
to Grupo Mexicano by the Mexican government.29 Grupo Mexicano
held one of several toll-road concessions from the Mexican
government, and the notes were issued because the toll-road projects
ran into difficulties due to the economic crisis that struck Mexico in
the mid-1990s.3° As well as being indebted to the plaintiffs, Grupo
Mexicano owed other debts of about $450 million.31 In Grupo
Mexicano's 1997 Form 20-F filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, it appeared that Grupo Mexicano's liabilities exceeded
its assets and there was "substantial doubt" whether it could continue
as a going concern.32 In October 1998, it publicly announced that it
would place $17 million of the notes in trust for employees in respect
of wages and salaries, and that it had transferred a further $100
million of the notes to the Mexican government to pay back taxes. 33
As Grupo Mexicano had no other substantial assets and appeared
to be at risk of insolvency, if not insolvent already, there appeared to
be a substantial risk that any judgment the plaintiffs obtained on the
notes would go unsatisfied.34 This was the finding of the district court
in proceedings that were different from the usual Mareva proceedings
in that they were inter partes.3 5 The plaintiffs were not able to ground
their claim for Mareva relief in any risk that Grupo Mexicano would
dissipate its assets.36 Indeed, Grupo Mexicano was quite open about
what it was doing and the plaintiffs consequently had to frame their
case in terms of preferring Mexican creditors over themselves and
other creditors.37 As discussed below, after the opinions of the Court
and the minority have been discussed in detail, this sort of conduct
does not provide the strongest grounds for Mareva relief.38 The order
of the district court enjoined Grupo Mexicano from "dissipating,
29. Id. at 310.
30. Id. at 310-11.
31. Id. at 311.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 311-12.
34. Id. at 312.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 311-12.
37. See id. at 312.
38. See infra Part IV.
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disbursing, transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise
distributing or affecting any [debtor's] right to, interest in, title to or
right to receive or retain, any of the [notes]."39 Given that the notes
were unsecured, this was strong relief indeed.
Two other factual circumstances should be stated. Grupo Mexicano
was a Mexican corporation and had voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the district court.4" The plaintiffs had no other cause of
action within the jurisdiction aside from this case. Neither were the
notes connected with the jurisdiction, so the claim for Mareva relief
was effectively a claim for extraterritorial relief of the kind that
English courts did not show themselves ready to grant until the
Mareva injunction was fourteen years old. Even assuming the
Supreme Court had been prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of
Mareva relief in the United States, this was an ambitious application.
The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal against the grant of this
relief' and certiorari was granted on the petition of Grupo Mexicano
("the petitioners").42 Meanwhile the plaintiffs continued with their
debt action on the notes themselves.43 They obtained judgment in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and a
permanent injunction to prevent the petitioners from disposing of the
notes in any way.44 The petitioners appealed this judgment to the
Second Circuit, but did not challenge the permanent injunction. 45 The
plaintiffs argued that this rendered the appeal against the preliminary
injunction moot. 46 Essentially the argument was that the preliminary
injunction merges into a permanent injunction, so that there is nothing
to appeal against if the latter is left intact.47 In deciding that the issue
was not moot the Supreme Court got this part of its decision right, but
its reasoning was far from satisfactory and revealed considerable
conceptual confusion as to the nature of Mareva relief.
As Justice Scalia pointed out, the plaintiffs' argument failed to
appreciate that preliminary Mareva relief is different from ordinary
39. Id. at 312-13 (quoting unpublished district court order).
40. See id. at 310, 312.
41. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d
688 (2d. Cir. 1998).
42. Gruvo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 525 U.S.
1015 (1998).
43. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 313 (noting that the case proceeded in
district court while the appeal of the preliminary injunction was pending in the circuit
court).
44. See id. at 312-13 (enjoining petitioners "from dissipating, disbursing,
transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise distributing or affecting any" of
the petitioner's rights to the notes).
45. See id. at 313.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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preliminary relief.4" This, however, was not for the reasons Justice
Scalia indicated. Ordinary preliminary relief merges into a permanent
injunction because it restrains until the outcome of the trial the very
thing a permanent injunction restrains the defendant from doing
afterwards. The permanent injunction thus continues what the
preliminary injunction had been doing temporarily. Mareva
injunctions, however, are ancillary to the main relief claimed at trial,
being designed to preserve assets so that any judgment granted in the
action is practically enforceable. The judgment is for debt or damages
and where, as is usual, the Mareva injunction is continued in aid of
enforcement this remains ancillary to the principal relief granted at
trial. Justice Scalia contrasted ordinary preliminary relief from
Mareva relief in terms of the former confirming that the defendant's
conduct was unlawful all along and the latter as establishing that
disposal of assets became unlawful only with the grant of the
permanent injunction.49 This is confusing because it implies that
judgment makes the disposal of assets unlawful. Where the plaintiff's
claim is unsecured this is simply wrong. Disposal of assets after
judgment is unlawful only where a permanent injunction is granted
restraining the disposal of those assets. As indicated in the previous
section a Mareva injunction should contain provisions protecting the
defendant by allowing the defendant to meet ordinary business
expenses and pay other creditors. The injunction should not restrain
the defendant from disposing, in any way, its only substantial asset
unless the plaintiff has a proprietary interest in that asset, which the
plaintiffs in Grupo Mexicano did not have.
But why did the petitioners want to appeal the Mareva injunction
when they had not appealed the permanent injunction? This was
because they wanted to enforce the plaintiffs' undertaking in damages
provided as a condition of the grant of Mareva relief. Because the
grant of a permanent Mareva injunction was ancillary to the judgment
and not a confirmation that the preliminary Mareva relief was
justified, it was eminently possible for the petitioners to show that
until judgment they had suffered loss as a result of being restrained
from doing what they were entitled to do at that time. Because the
grounds on which they attacked the Mareva injunction went to the
root of the federal courts' power to grant such relief, it would seem
that this approach must undermine the permanent Mareva injunction
as well. Where a preliminary Mareva injunction is attacked on the
basis that the grounds for granting it had not been established, the
permanent Mareva injunction could stand because the question
whether it was needed in support of enforcement would become a
fresh issue to be considered again at trial.
48. See id. at 313-18; see also id. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
49. See id. at 316.
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III. OPINION OF THE COURT-REJECTING MAREVA
Justice Scalia's opinion began relatively uncontroversially. He
pointed out that when the thirteen British colonies won their
independence and afterwards formed the United States of America,
they constituted themselves a separate legal system but inherited the
fundamental principles of the common law. 0 The power of the
federal courts to grant equitable relief, including injunctions, was
derived from the Judiciary Act of 1789."1 The Act authorized the
federal courts to apply "'the principles of the system of judicial
remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the
English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two
countries."'52 Justice Scalia quoted the following:
Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the
jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court c'f Chancery in
England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the
enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789.53
None of this can be quarrelled with because the implication is that
the federal courts inherited the principles of equity administered by
the English Court of Chancery. Those principles are not immutable
like "the law of the Medes and Persians is, That no decree, nor
statute, which the king establisheth may be changed,"54 but can be
adapted to the perceived needs of later times. English courts did not
grant anything resembling Mareva injunctions in the late eighteenth
century, but that does not mean that developments along those lines
would be incompatible with the said principles. If courts in England
and other parts of the common law world have subsequently
developed Mareva injunctions without significant assistance from the
legislature, that would seem to create a presumption that these orders
are consistent with eighteenth century equitable principles.
Shortly after this promising start Justice Scalia's opinion fell into
error. He next formulated the question for the Court, as follows:
"We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents requested
here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity."55 This is the
wrong question. It envisages an inordinately narrow ability for courts
of equity to mold the remedies they grant over time to meet changing
circumstances. It rests on a specific conception of originalism that,
whatever its merits in relation to judicial review of legislative action,56
50. See id. at 318.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563,568 (1939)).
53. Id. (quoting A. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 660
(1928)).
54. Daniel 6:15 (King James).
55. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319.
56. This conception of originalism is one that restricts the ability of the courts to
grant relief only in the concrete circumstances envisaged by the persons who
2005] 2169
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is singularly unhelpful in the development of private law. Judicial
restraint is favored when the will of the elected legislature is being
constitutionally tested. But private law and civil procedure are
normally left to the courts to mold in the light of experience.
The correct approach was the one adopted by Justice Ginsburg for
the dissent. Beginning with an acknowledgement that the source of
judicial power lay in the principles of equity inherited from England in
1789, Justice Ginsburg lambasted the opinion of the Court for its
narrow conception of those principles. To the argument that the
relief requested here was not afforded in 1789, Justice Ginsburg
replied:
In my view, the Court relies on an unjustifiably static conception of
equity jurisdiction. From the beginning, we have defined the scope
of federal equity in relation to the principles of equity existing at the
separation of this country from England... we have never limited
federal equity jurisdiction to the specific practices and remedies of
the pre-Revolutionary Chancellor. 5
Justice Ginsburg presented a strikingly different picture of a
"dynamic equity jurisprudence" that was "of special importance in the
commercial law context"59 and supported this by reference to the
Supreme Court's decrees in desegregation and antitrust cases.'
Although the opinion of the Court did improve upon its puzzlingly
narrow approach, to ask whether it would be legitimate to expand
equitable remedies beyond their late eighteenth century sphere of
operation, it seems clear that the Court's inability to envisage a
development like Mareva was heavily colored by its conception of
what it was that American courts inherited from England.
The next section of the opinion of the Court did, at least, suggest
that the majority accepted that equity was not locked in a time warp.
However, even this section cranks up the rhetoric excessively and
overuses pejoratives in its dismissal of the Mareva injunction. Thus
the argument that recognition of Mareva relief would further the
"'grand aims of equity'' and fill a gap where legal remedies were not
"'practical and efficient"'61 was met by a lengthy quotation from the
1836 edition of Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on Equity.62 This
formulated the relevant principle, as opposed to a principle of higher abstraction to
which courts could apply to other circumstances at a later time. One very interesting
account of this idea of originalism may be found in Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990).
57. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 336.
59. Id. at 337.
60. Id. at 337 n.4.
61. Id. at 321 (quoting Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id. at 321-22 (quoting I Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§ 12, at 14-15 (1836)).
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passage refutes the proposition that equity can grant relief
inconsistent with the common law. Yet, it is not on point because
Mareva relief contradicts no common law principle and operates to
ensure that judgments, more often than not common law judgments,
can be enforced. When Justice Scalia expressed the majority's
unwillingness to expand equitable jurisdiction, he took none of the
sting out:
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the
federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad
boundaries of traditional equitable relief. To accord a type of relief
that has never been available before-and especially (as here) a type
of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by longstanding
judicial precedent-is to invoke a "default rule".. . not of flexibility
but of omnipotence. 63
One is tempted to ask what "broad boundaries" Justice Scalia was
actually talking about. The majority's conception of equity's
boundaries is extremely narrow, not broad. The statement that the
relief claimed here has been "specifically disclaimed by longstanding
judicial precedent"' is false. No authority was cited in support of this
intemperate statement other than Lister & Co. v. Stubbs,65 which was
concerned with an application for a very different kind of relief. The
plaintiff there sought an injunction to compel the defendant to pay
money into court in security for the plaintiff's claim. 66 A Mareva
injunction operates in personam by restraining the defendant from
disposing of assets. The injunction preserves those assets for the
potential benefit of all the defendant's creditors and provides no
priority or security for the litigant who moved the court. The most
that can be said about the novelty of the Mareva injunction is that
prior to 1975 it had not been granted. To say, as did Justice Scalia,
that it had been "specifically disclaimed" is wholly without
foundation.67
Justice Scalia's next argument was that the Mareva injunction was
such a dramatic departure from previous practice that its introduction
should be left to Congress. 68 As already mentioned, private law and
civil procedure are usually matters left to the courts. The courts in
England, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore,
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 45 Ch. D. 1 (C.A. 1890). Cotton, L. writes in Lister that the relief requested
was in effect proprietary. See id. at 13. Lister was cited at a later stage of Justice
Scalia's opinion. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 328. Scalia also cites De Beers
Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 222 (1945), but the discussion
at this section of the opinion demolishes any pretentions that case has as
"longstanding judicial precedent." Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322, 326-27.
66. Lister, 45 Ch. D. at 1.
67. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322.
68. Id. at 322, 329.
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Malaysia, and other parts of the common law world have shown
themselves to be fully cognizant of this reality. The opinion of the
Court effectively says everyone else is wrong and only we are right!
The argument as developed by Justice Scalia is based on mainly
obsolete material" and reveals complacency and misunderstanding.
His answer to Justice Ginsburg's argument about the increasing
complexities of modern business relations and sophisticated ways of
hiding and disposing of assets7 ° was to say that there is nothing new
about debtors not paying debts or preferring creditors-the law of
fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy exists to deal with these
conflicts. There may be nothing new about debtors not paying debts
but the debtor's prison has been abolished and the legal system has
not caught up with modern ways of debtors evading their
responsibilities.71 The reference to the law of fraudulent conveyances
and bankruptcy simply misses the point. The abuse of process which
the Mareva injunction is designed to stop is the dissipation of assets,
not their transfer to persons willing to allow the debtor to continue
using them and not preferences of some creditors over others. A
further development of this line of argument implied that debtors
should be protected from interference with using their assets until
judgment.72 There is an air of unreality about this. Trials in debt
actions are relatively rare and the legal process can very easily be
exploited by defendants to buy time to make themselves judgment
proof. Debtors should be protected against abuse of process by
plaintiffs but that is what the measures outlined above73 are designed
to do. The idea that an indefinite injunction should be imposed
because the plaintiff believes the defendant can easily dispose of the
assets necessary for securing the plaintiff's claims is inaccurate.74 Why
is there so little confidence by the U. S. Supreme Court that the grant
69. This is the view of Lawrence Collins in his piece on Grupo Mexicano. See
Collins, supra note 3, at 604. In addition to Justice Story's Equity Jurisprudence, the
Court relied on Marion Hetherington's 1983 Australian text. Grupo Mexicano, 527
U.S. at 328-29 (citing Marion Hetherington, Introduction to the Mareva Injunction, in
Mareva Injunctions I n.1 (1983)). Justice Scalia also cited Professor Rhonda
Wasserman's article. Id. at 329 (citing Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed:
Preliminary Injunctions to Secure Potential Money Judgments, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 257,
337 (1992)). The Wasserman article may not be obsolete, but, as an article published
in a jurisdiction that did not recognize the Mareva injunction, it may have been cited
to prove a point.
70. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 338-39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
71. Justice Ginsburg's minority opinion drew attention to increasingly
sophisticated foreign haven judgment-proofing strategies and "technology that
permits nearly instantaneous transfer of assets abroad." Id.
72. Id. at 329.
73. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
74. See Justice Ginsburg's refutation of this "parade of horribles." Grupo
Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 339-42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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of Mareva relief, subject to these conditions, can maintain a fair
balance between the parties?
The Court then proceeded to discuss three previous Supreme Court
cases where relief similar to that requested in Grupo Mexicano had
been at issue.75 An injunction to prevent disposal of assets was
granted in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp. ,76 but in that case the
plaintiffs' claims were proprietary. The plaintiffs sought the rescission
of contracts with, and restitution of money paid to, an insolvent
investment fund." Preliminary injunctive relief to preserve the fund
against which the plaintiffs had a strong claim was properly granted,78
and thus the case is easily distinguishable from Grupo Mexicano.
Also easily distinguishable and essentially similar was United States v
First National City Bank79 where an injunction was granted against
foreign taxpayers pursuant to statutory powers and in protection of an
equitable tax lien. Relief was refused in De Beers Consolidated Mines
Ltd. v. United States,8° where no proprietary relief was at issue.
DeBeers was an antitrust action brought against foreign corporations
by the Justice Department.8" The injunction sought was intended to
prevent the defendant corporations from removing assets from the
jurisdiction against which a fine could be levied.82 DeBeers was
another 5-4 decision, in which Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, stated that the purpose of the injunction was to obtain
security for the antitrust action.83 Notably, the case was decided thirty
years before the first Mareva injunction was granted. As a basis for
determining that Mareva relief cannot be granted, this has a distinctly
underwhelming effect. Justice Ginsburg put it well when she said, "it
is one thing to recognize that equity courts typically did not provide
this relief, quite another to conclude that, therefore, the remedy was
beyond equity's capacity."'84
The next section of the Grupo Mexicano opinion is perhaps the
most disappointing of all. Here Justice Scalia acknowledged the
existence of arguments addressed to the Court as to why it should
recognize the legitimacy of Mareva relief.85 All Justice Scalia could
bring himself to do was quote the following passage from the brief for
the United States, which had only an amicus curiae role in the
75. Id. at 324-27.
76. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
77. Id. at 285.
78. Id. at 288-89.
79. 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
80. 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
81. Id. at 215.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 219.
84. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 338 (1999).
85. Id. at 339.
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proceedings. The United States' arguments for acceptance of the
Mareva injunction were:
[S]implicity and uniformity of procedure; preservation of the court's
ability to render a judgment that will prove enforceable; prevention
of inequitable conduct on the part of defendants; avoiding
disparities between defendants that have assets within the
jurisdiction (which would be subject to pre-judgment attachment "at
law") and those that do not; avoiding the necessity for plaintiffs to
locate a forum in which the defendant has substantial assets; and, in
an age of easy global mobility of capital, preserving the
attractiveness of the United States as a center for financial
transactions.8 6
Justice Scalia made no attempt to explain what any of these
arguments meant, let alone to assess their merit or persuasiveness.
The arguments of the plaintiffs and those who filed briefs supporting
them were treated with the same insulting dismissiveness that was
shown throughout this opinion to the very eminent judges of other
countries who have molded this procedure with great care. After
setting out these arguments for the Mareva injunction, Justice Scalia
roundly declared that there were important counter-considerations.87
Among these were the prospect of abuse of process, the importance of
jury trial protection, and the historic principle that before judgment an
unsecured creditor has no rights in the property of the debtor. These
arguments have been sufficiently refuted in the previous discussion.
Next, the opinion argued that Mareva relief was not needed anyway
because creditors could obtain sufficient protection against debtors
making themselves judgment proof by seeking state law prejudgment
attachment orders, available in federal court through Rule 64 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 In fact, the Mareva injunction was
even more objectionable, because it could render existing creditor
protection remedies irrelevant. "Why go through the trouble of
complying with local attachment and garnishment statutes when this
all-purpose prejudgment injunction is available?"89 Aside from over-
reliance on rhetoric, this argument is misconceived for the following
reason: Mareva injunctions may be easier to get because of the ex
parte procedure, but they contain considerable protection for
defendants and third parties, and they do not provide relief as
extensive as attachment because they operate in personam only.9"
86. Id. at 330.
87. Id.
88. Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
89. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 330-31.
90. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Mareva injunctions do not deprive the
defendant of possession of attached assets. Id. at 337-38 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Scalia then went on to argue that "[m]ore importantly" this
new order could alter the balance between creditors' and debtors'
rights developed through the bankruptcy laws.9 This argument is
nonsensical. Mareva injunctions operate in personam and are
incapable of altering the balance of creditors' and debtors' rights in
bankruptcy. Next, Justice Scalia asserted that the Mareva injunction
might encourage a "'race to the courthouse"' that could prove fatal to
a "struggling debtor."'92 No evidence was produced to substantiate
this fear and it is extremely difficult to see why creditors would be
racing to the courthouse were this relief available. The Mareva
injunction gives creditors no rights to debtors' assets and does not
improve their position in bankruptcy. The relief does make suing
more worthwhile, but if the debtor is insolvent there will be little point
in continuing with the case. In the latter case, the debtor's bankruptcy
becomes more fruitful for all of its creditors, who might suffer greater
hardship were the debtor free to dissipate assets and leave nothing for
anybody. Justice Scalia tried to make something out of the fact that
the plaintiffs did not represent all of the noteholders.93 To the extent
that one creditor has exercised its own initiative, and where its
interests are not antithetical to those of other creditors, this is not on
point. Where a potential conflict exists between the applicant creditor
and others, as was the case here, it is left to the court's discretion
whether to grant relief in that particular case. As an argument against
recognition of the Mareva injunction, Scalia's argument does not hold
up to scrutiny.
The opinion of the Court then worked its way towards its
conclusion. This section added very little to previous sections but is
worthy of comment nonetheless because it demonstrates the opinion's
overall lack of substance. First, Justice Scalia stated that the Court
would not decide who had the better of the arguments for and against
recognition of the Mareva injunction.94 After the very lengthy
dismissal of the Mareva injunction that preceded it, this comment
cannot be taken seriously. The reason for setting out these arguments
was to show that resolving them was incompatible with the
"democratic and self-deprecating judgment we have long since made:
that the equitable powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did
not include the power to create remedies previously unknown to
equity jurisprudence."95 As this Essay has shown, these arguments
were resolved in past cases and legal commentary, and the opinion of
the Court contains no self-deprecating qualities whatsoever. Next
Justice Scalia cited another lengthy quotation from Justice Story. This
91. Id. at 331.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 332.
95. Id.
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excerpt contains a quotation from Selden equating the Chancellor's
conscience with the length of his foot.9 6 The clear implication of this is
that courts in England and other common law countries are exercising
a similar jurisdiction whenever they grant Mareva relief. Scalia's
parting shot was that "[t]he debate concerning this formidable power
over debtors should be conducted and resolved where such issues
belong in our democracy: in the Congress."97 This argument has been
answered already, but it provides a suitable opportunity to move on
and consider whether there was any other decision the Supreme Court
could have reached if it felt genuine hesitancy about recognizing the
Mareva injunction.
IV. A MIDDLE COURSE: DECLINING TO GRANT MAREVA RELIEF IN
GRUPO MEXICANO
The arguments of the majority against recognizing the Mareva
injunction are not totally devoid of merit. It is true that this type of
injunction is strong relief, that it can involve hardship for defendants,
and that it does represent a significant departure from the practice of
the courts in the common law world prior to 1975. Unfortunately,
these arguments were presented with such a woeful lack of balance
that most of their persuasive force was dissipated. Even more
unfortunate was the failure of the majority to consider whether a
better disposal of the case before the Court would have been to
decline to grant a Mareva injunction in these circumstances, while
leaving undecided the question of whether this kind of relief could
ever be granted.
As indicated above, the plaintiffs did not make the strongest
application for Mareva relief. Three factors would have undermined
their position had they appeared before a court in England. First,
there was the tenuous connection between the defendants and the
jurisdiction. In England, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of
1982,98 section 25(3) as amended, allows the court to grant Mareva
relief where the plaintiff has no cause of action within the jurisdiction,
but also gives the court discretion to refuse relief if it thinks that
having no jurisdiction apart from the section makes it inexpedient to
grant relief.99 Grupo Mexicano had submitted to the jurisdiction of
the district court, but its connection with New York remained rather
tenuous. Second, the assets to be frozen were located in Mexico.
English courts strongly emphasized that this sort of relief is
exceptional when they first asserted the power to grant it."° But third,
96. Id. at 332-33 (citing I Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, §
19, at 19 (1836)).
97. Id. at 333.
98. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, c. 27, § 25(3) (Eng.).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 18.
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and more importantly, there was little evidence that Grupo Mexicano
was going to dispose of its assets in a way that Mareva principles find
objectionable. In one of the earliest Mareva cases in England, Iraqi
Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co.,' the injunction was
varied to allow the defendant to discharge an obligation not legally
owed but at least binding in honor.'0 2 The court pointed out that
Mareva injunctions were not designed to prevent defendants from
paying their creditors, including this sort of creditor, and were
intended really to deal with dissipation of assets that makes the
defendant judgment proof. 103 The plaintiffs could only prove in
Grupo Mexicano that the defendants were setting aside assets in favor
of some of their creditors and that it was likely this would mean they
(the plaintiffs) would not be paid."° As Lawrence Collins has pointed
out, in light of all these circumstances, it would have been unlikely
that an English court would have granted a Mareva injunction. 05
The first two of these considerations were matters of discretion and
it is difficult to see how the Supreme Court could have justified
interfering with the trial judge's decision on them. However, the third
consideration went right to the heart of the Mareva procedure and
was concerned with the proper purposes of Mareva relief. It was
reviewable error and made it wholly unnecessary for the Supreme
Court to decide that federal courts had no jurisdiction to grant Mareva
relief. Due to the inadequate consideration given to the arguments
for accepting the Mareva injunction and the weakness of the
arguments for rejecting the injunction, it is deeply disappointing that
the Supreme Court did not even consider the approach taken by the
House of Lords in the first Mareva case to be appealed to that
tribunal. In Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera, °6 their Lordships
confounded Lord Denning's fears that they would repudiate the new
procedure altogether by deciding that it was not available in that case
because the plaintiffs had no cause of action within the jurisdiction.'07
But by taking the overkill approach the Supreme Court has made it
very difficult for this kind of relief to be debated again in the
foreseeable future.
101. 1 Q.B. 65 (1981).
102. Id. at 72-73.
103. Id.
104. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999).
105. Collins, supra note 3, at 604.
106. [1979] A.C. 210 (H.L. 1977).
107. See Lord Denning, The Due Process of Law 141, 145 (1980).
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V. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACCEPT THE MAREVA
INJUNCTION
Although this part of the Essay discusses Justice Ginsburg's
minority opinion, it does not take the form of the "line by line"
commentary administered to the opinion of the Court. For the most
part Justice Ginsburg's opinion is a convincing refutation of the
Court's reasons why the Mareva injunction should not be recognized
in the United States but is rather less convincing on why this
procedure should be recognized.
The minority opinion attempts to put the case for granting Mareva
relief to the plaintiffs by showing how the circumstances of the case
cried out for a remedy. Thus Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the
plaintiffs' evidence was uncontested and that it must have appeared to
the district court that they were almost certain to get judgment.1"8 In
the absence of provisional relief, the plaintiffs would be unable to
collect their debt and the grant of the injunction would preserve the
status quo until trial.1"9 This is all well and good except that Justice
Ginsburg erred when she explained why it was that the plaintiffs
would be unable to collect their debt.110 This was because the
defendants preferred their Mexican creditors. As explained above,
this is an insufficient basis for the grant of Mareva relief.111 The
plaintiff must show that the defendant is dissipating assets, not using
them to meet other legal liabilities. The case for recognizing the
Mareva injunction must be found in other arguments than those used
by Justice Ginsburg.
Grupo Mexicano begins with the recognition that there is no
jurisdictional bar to the acceptance of the Mareva injunction. The
United States inherited the same system and principles of equity as
England possessed prior to the formation of the United States. That
system was passed on to several other common law countries. All of
these were able to follow the lead of England and spawn a remedy
which has today assumed enormous importance within these
countries' systems of civil and commercial remedies. All this was
accomplished with very little help from the legislature. The legislative
help that was given mainly confirmed the legitimacy of the remedy
and rectified matters of detail.112 So the Supreme Court had a choice.
108. As indeed they had by the time of the Supreme Court hearing.
109. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 333-35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
110. Id.
111. See supra Part IV.
112. See, for example, the Supreme Court Act of 1981, which states:
The power of the High Court under subsection (1) to grant an interlocutory
injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from the
jurisdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets located
within that jurisdiction shall be exercisable in cases where that party is, as
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But why should it have exercised that choice in favor of the Mareva
injunction?
It should have accepted the Mareva injunction because the United
States very likely experiences the same problems that led eminent
jurists around the world to fashion a remedy to protect litigants from
unsatisfied judgments and courts from having their process stultified.
It is counterintuitive to deny that defendants with no defense to civil
claims would never transfer assets out of the jurisdiction or otherwise
dissipate them so that no judgment could be enforced against them. A
lawyer with any experience knows that in the vast majority of debt
claims any argument on liability is most likely to relate to parts of the
claim and not to the entire sum. Furthermore, a lawyer is hired not
merely to go to court and win the case. He must also collect the debt.
Enforcement is everything. Obviously, the burden rests on the
opponents of Mareva injunctions to substantiate their position. If the
United States declines to recognize the Mareva injunction there may
be a risk that it becomes a haven for persons determined to evade
their legal responsibilities to deposit their assets. This, indeed,
accounts for the extension of Mareva relief in the United Kingdom to
situations where there are assets within the jurisdiction but the
plaintiff's claim is justiciable only in another jurisdiction.'13
In fairness it should be recognized that there are some problems
with the Mareva injunction. To freeze a defendant's assets, even
limited to a maximum sum, on an ex parte application, even with
provision for the defendant to seek discharge or variation of the
order, can cause enormous hardship. This hardship is recognized in
other parts of the common law world but the view is taken that it is
better to provide a measure of relief for claimants, while providing
some protection for defendants, than to ignore the problem. People
and organizations who are owed vast sums of money are not likely to
write it all off with a philosophical shrugging of the shoulders. They
may opt for less savory ways of being paid than recourse to a legal
process that cannot do anything for them. While this Essay may read
like the inverse of the "parade of horribles" invoked against the
Mareva injunction, " 4 it is probably no less plausible. Which risk is the
one to take and which is the one to avoid? Why has the United States
chosen the path of isolationism?
There may, of course, be some arguments against the Mareva
injunction not credited in the discussion above. One argument, which
the opinion of the Court made very little of, is that Mareva relief is not
needed because a suitable alternative exists in the form of pre-trial
well as in cases where he is not, domiciled, resident or present within that
jurisdiction.
Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 37(3) (Eng.).
113. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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attachment. The Court might have argued that given the doubts
about Mareva relief the United States should rely on its own tried and
trusted creditor protection mechanisms. But Justice Scalia chose not
to rely on this alternative remedy."5 In any event this argument
would have lent itself rather better to declining to grant Mareva relief
in Grupo Mexicano, rather than ruling out this relief altogether.
1 16
The other arguments presented in the opinion of the Court relied far
too much on rhetoric and bombast and carried no persuasive force.
The last word at this stage should be left to three American
commentators. Commenting on the Grupo Mexicano case, James,
Hazard, and Leubsdorf state:
As a matter of policy, this makes little sense. Although a
preliminary injunction of this sort can raise problems, for example
by giving the party obtaining it an advantage over other creditors, it
can also be a useful way to prevent an unscrupulous defendant from
dispersing its assets while litigation winds its lengthy way.
117
Aside from the implication that a Mareva creditor can get some sort
of priority over other creditors, this puts the matter nicely. Removing
the error only makes the argument stronger.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has not pulled too many punches, and its tone and
arguments are not characterized by moderation. But all this is only
because the Court does such an awful job of explaining why the
Mareva injunction should not be part of the remedial machinery of the
federal courts. Only lip service was paid to the arguments presented
for accepting relief of this kind and the reasons advanced against
accepting it were sloppy, superficial, intemperate, bombastic,
unbalanced, and downright insulting to judicial colleagues in kindred
legal traditions who have forged this relief very carefully over a
quarter of a century. Not even the opinion of the minority reveals a
clear understanding of what a Mareva injunction is. If the Supreme
Court could not get itself properly briefed so that it understood the
nature of the relief it was being asked to grant, then the least
dangerous course would have been to decline to grant an injunction in
the circumstances of the case before it. One also has to wonder why
certiorari was even granted in Grupo Mexicano. There was no
conflict between the circuits and the issues were mainly of
private/commercial law and civil procedure not obviously requiring
determination by the highest court. An opinion by the Second Circuit
might well have carried more weight than one from the Supreme
Court on a matter like this. Perhaps the complex relationship
115. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
116. See supra Part IV.
117. Fleming James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure 340 (5th ed. 2001).
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between the United States and Mexico had something to do with the
Court's intervention, although nothing of this appears in the opinions.
The United States was nursing the traumatized Mexican economy
through the currency and other crises of the mid 1990s and the
relationship between the two countries was affected by the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Was the United States simply
determined to keep out of a dispute concerned with such a major
infrastructure project as the toll roads? Certainly the absence of
rational dispassionate analysis in the opinion of the Court is
disturbing. The Court's decision does not supply one with a great deal
of confidence about the Court's ability to deal calmly with issues of
more obvious political controversy.
Notes & Observations
